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ABSTRACT 
 
Modified versions of the original Derived Relational Intrusions Following 
Training paradigm (DRIFT; Guinther & Dougher, 2010) were used to engineer semantic 
false memories and contextually-controlled semantic false memories in group data. 
Experiment I replicated and extended the original DRIFT paradigm by showing that 
interrelated conditional discrimination training (match-to-sample; MTS) could influence 
subsequent false recall even in the absence of tests of symmetry and transitivity. It was 
also found that false recall was especially likely among those participants whose self 
reports indicated awareness that the study list words shared a common conditionally 
discriminative function. Experiment II required participants to complete a contextually-
controlled MTS training procedure in which study list words were assigned to participate 
in a functional equivalence class with one set of non-study words in one context but with 
a different set of non-study words in a different context. Subsequent transfer of the study 
list words’ remembering function to non-study words (i.e., false recall) was found to be 
vii 
 
dependent upon the context in which the free recall test was administered, thus 
demonstrating engineered contextual control of semantic false memory.      
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Introduction 
Semantic false memory phenomena have typically been studied by cognitive 
psychologists, who use these phenomena to infer the properties of cognitive processes 
and structures thought to be responsible for the encoding, storage, and retrieval of 
information (e.g., see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Gallo, 2006). False memory phenomena 
are also of direct interest to those researchers who are interested in understanding 
allegations of childhood sexual abuse (e.g., Ceci & Friedman, 2000; Goodman & Clarke-
Stewart, 1991; Lyon, 1995) and the credibility eyewitness testimony (e.g., Loftus, 1975; 
Loftus & Palmer, 1974). Such cognitive and applied investigations have been useful in 
the elaboration of schema theory (e.g., Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Minsky, 1975; Schank 
& Abelson, 1977), which in turn forms the theoretical rationale underlying a major 
branch of psychotherapy (i.e., cognitive therapy; Beck, 1976). In order to characterize 
semantic false memory phenomena in terms of the environmental variables of interest to 
behavior analysts, we (Guinther & Dougher, 2010) recently developed the Derived 
Relational Intrusions Following Training (DRIFT) paradigm. 
The DRIFT paradigm was designed to produce experimentally some of the 
semantic behaviors exhibited during implementations of its paradigmatic predecessor, 
namely the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959a, 1959b; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The DRM paradigm has been enormously useful in the 
study of semantic false memory phenomena, showing that preexperimentally established 
semantic relationships are predictive of specific memory intrusions (i.e., instances of 
false recall). For example, given a list of preexperimentally semantically related words to 
remember such as bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snore etc., a person in an English-
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speaking community is likely to erroneously recall the semantically-related word sleep, 
even though this word was not on the original study list. Thus, the DRM paradigm allows 
researchers to predict the likelihood of specific intrusions from measures of semantic 
relations, though the semantic relations themselves were presumably established prior to 
experimentation.   
In order to insure the semantic relatedness of DRM study words to particular non-
study words, the original DRM study lists were constructed using nomothetic information 
gathered during free association tasks (Deese, 1959a, 1959b). Participants were asked to 
state the first word that came to mind following the presentation of probing root words, 
and their responses were recorded. Modal responses (i.e., words that would become the 
DRM study list items) to the root words (i.e., words presumed to be likely intrusions) 
were to be expected, given that the participants had extensive common natural learning 
histories with respect to the use of the root words. That is, all of the participants had been 
exposed to historical environments that promoted the speaking of coherent English, in 
which specific utterances were likely to have been reinforced under specific 
circumstances. For example, in English-speaking communities one is likely to be 
reinforced for emitting the words sleep, bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snore, etc. in the 
presence of sleeping people and in the presence of beds etc., and also in the presence of 
these same words. With respect to the intraverbal operants frequently emitted during free 
association tasks, Skinner (1957) elaborates on the historical interaction between 
nonverbal and verbal stimuli and the reinforcement of subsequent verbal responses:  
We may assume … that, aside from intraverbal sequences specifically 
acquired, a verbal stimulus will be an occasion for the reinforcement of a 
Contextual DRIFT   3 
 
verbal response of different form when, for any reason, the two forms 
frequently occur together. A common reason is that the nonverbal 
circumstances under which they are emitted occur together. … We may 
speak of the tendency to occur together as ‘contiguous usage.’ In the usual 
word-association experiment, [many of the observed] intraverbal operants 
appear to be explained by contiguous usage. There are times when it is 
well to have certain operants in readiness…when talking about lakes, it is 
advantageous to have the form sea available. In accounting for a specific 
intraverbal operant it is necessary to substitute an actual reinforcing event 
for an “advantage.” In general, however, it is enough to show that the form 
sea is likely to occur in the context of lake; animal in the context of cat; 
tears in the context of pain; and so on. … Certain exceptions, in which 
frequency of response does not follow frequent contiguous usage, may be 
traced to specific reinforcements, especially where responses have a 
limited currency or where the history of the speaker is unusual. (Skinner, 
1957, p. 75)             
It then appears that one way to produce DRM-like semantic false memory 
phenomena would be to influence contiguous usage. That is, false memory phenomena 
may follow from learning histories in which the emission of a word (i.e., a word that 
would be considered to be an intrusion in a subsequent memory test, such as sleep) in the 
presence of some other word (i.e., a word used as a study item in a subsequent memory 
test, such as bed) had been reinforced on past occasions. More specifically, it is possible 
that intraverbal operants arising from contiguous usage and emitted during free 
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association tests are also likely to be emitted during free recall tests, and such behaviors 
would then be labeled by researchers as false memory phenomena. 
In contrast to Skinner’s depiction of the contingencies involved in contiguous 
usage, many cognitive psychologists emphasize mere stimulus co-occurrence as the 
source of semantic relations (e.g., Burgess, 1998; Fodor, 1983; Foltz, 1996; Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998; Lund & Burgess, 1996; see also 
Hutchison, 2003), which would imply that false memories are ultimately traceable to 
historical stimulus co-occurrence. That is, the functional relationship between stimuli is 
often ignored by cognitive psychologists, whose explanations are instead cast in terms of 
an information-processing metaphor. While there are a multitude of cognitive 
explanations of semantic relatedness, one prominent cognitive metaphor maintains that 
the degree semantic relatedness between stimuli is a reflection of the degree of 
association between mental representations of the stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins 
& Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992). The strength of association between representations 
is thought to increase following the simultaneous activation of the mental representations 
of the stimuli, and, in turn, the simultaneous activation of the mental representations can 
result from the perceived co-occurrence of stimulus referents. For example, if the word 
sleep frequently co-occurs with the words bed, rest awake, etc., then the representations 
of these words would become strongly associated within a hypothetical mental 
architecture. Further supposing that a memory retrieval system relies on stimulus 
associations for its cognitive functioning (e.g., Roediger et a. 2001), the retrieval of the 
words bed, rest, awake, etc. could lead to the erroneous retrieval of the strongly 
associated word sleep. That is, a cognitive psychologist may say that sleep is intruded in 
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the DRM paradigm because sleep is associated with bed, rest, awake, etc., which is to say 
that these words have frequently co-occurred on past occasions. Of note, Skinner’s 
contiguous usage could be reduced to stimulus co-occurrence, should the functional 
relations between stimuli (e.g., those relations arising from operant contingencies) prove 
to be inconsequential to subsequent remembering behavior.              
However, it may also be the case that false memory phenomena can arise from 
learning histories in which the relationships between words are not the result of direct 
reinforcement or stimulus co-occurrence (as is the case with contiguous usage), but are 
instead acquired indirectly. That is, it is well established that relationships between 
stimuli can be derived (see Hayes, Barnes-Homes, & Roche, 2001; Sidman, 1971, 1994; 
Sidman & Tailby, 1982), suggesting the possibility that certain false memory phenomena 
may result from those environmental manipulations that promote the derivation of 
stimulus relations. We (Guinther & Dougher, 2010) recently tested this possibility 
through the DRIFT paradigm, showing that interrelated conditional discrimination 
training (match-to-sample, MTS) with tests of symmetry and transitivity (see Sidman 
1971; Sidman 1994; Sidman & Tailby 1982) was sufficient for the derivation of novel 
semantic relationships, and that the training likewise resulted in corresponding semantic 
false memories. Specifically, a group of random English words was assigned to a 
common stimulus equivalence class for MTS training, stimulus equivalence was tested, 
and then a subset of the words from within the class was presented for memorization. On 
subsequent tests of free recall and recognition, words that had been assigned to the same 
class as the study list words were more likely to be intruded and falsely recognized than 
words that had been assigned to different classes. Furthermore, stimuli that frequently co-
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occurred with study list words during prior MTS training were not especially likely to be 
intruded or falsely recognized on subsequent memory tests. We interpreted these findings 
to reflect the differential transfer of an instructed “remembering” function from study 
words to same-class non-study words; the intrusions and false recognitions reflected the 
formation of corresponding functional equivalence classes (see Donahoe & Palmer, 2004; 
Dougher & Markham, 1994, 1996; Goldiamond, 1962, 1966). Importantly, there were no 
preexperimental semantic relationships between study list words and intruded or falsely 
recognized words. Instead, artificial semantic relationships were created through the 
experimental manipulation of environmental variables promoting the derivation of 
stimulus relations, and, hence, semantic false memory phenomena were likewise 
controlled.  
It is important to keep in mind that there are several different ways of 
conceptualizing “semantic relations.” Within the field of cognitive psychology, semantic 
relations are typically conceived of as being embodied in structural linkages between 
informational representations of linguistic terms and physical referents (e.g., Anderson, 
1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992); cognitive psychologists use public 
behaviors to infer the properties of these mental (i.e., hypothetical, cognitive) semantic 
structures. In contrast, behavior analysts make no appeal to mental structures in their 
accounts of semantic relations. Instead, semantic relations are considered to be manifest 
in particular behaviors, and these behaviors are to be understood in terms of the 
conditions under which they occur. According to one line of behavior analytic thinking 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005; Hayes & Bisset, 1998; Sidman, 1994), semantic behaviors 
occur when the stimuli controlling these behaviors have acquired their functions 
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indirectly through derived relationships. That is, semantic behaviors are thought to occur 
under the conditions that give rise to derived relational responding. For example, if a 
person is trained or instructed that A=B and A=C, the spontaneous (i.e., untrained and 
uninstructed) emission of behaviors consistent with the relation B=C would be taken as 
evidence that there is a semantic relation between B and C. This type of semantic 
behavior is often exhibited by verbally competent individuals following MTS training, as 
was found in the original DRIFT study when participants derived equivalence between 
study words and non-study words that had been assigned to a common class (Guinther & 
Dougher, 2010).  
The two experiments in the current study were designed to replicate and extend 
the original DRIFT paradigm. Experiment I was intended to more closely specify the 
MTS training characteristics essential for the production of subsequent semantic false 
memories. In particular, we wished to determine if tests of symmetry and transitivity 
during MTS were necessary components of the paradigm, and therefore did not include 
them in the current DRIFT designs. That is, if stimulus equivalence and functional 
equivalence are both the product of a common learning history (e.g., MTS training; see 
McIlvane & Dube, 1990), then, following such a history, demonstrations of stimulus 
equivalence should not be necessary for demonstrations of functional equivalence (i.e., 
higher levels of intruding for words assigned to the same class as study words should be 
evident even in the absence of tests for stimulus equivalence).    
Also differing from the original DRIFT design, the study list words’ MTS sample 
stimulus was not displayed during study list presentation in Experiment I. When 
participants were ostensibly memorizing the study list words under the original DRIFT 
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design, the presence of the sample stimulus may have influenced participants’ 
interpretations of the meanings of the words. For example, if all of the study list words 
came from a class in which a red square served as the conditional sample during MTS, 
the presence of the red square during study list memorization could have helped some 
participants abstract that all of the words came from the same class. As such, the presence 
of the sample stimulus could have influenced performance on subsequent memory tests. 
As an exploratory manipulation in Experiment I, we did not present the study words’ 
MTS sample during study list presentation and later asked participants whether they were 
aware that all of the study words came from the same class. 
Experiment II of the current study was intended to extend the original DRIFT 
study through the introduction of manipulations that are known to affect derived 
relationships and the transfer of stimulus functions. Specifically, equivalence responding 
can be brought under contextual control through appropriate environmental 
manipulations (Wulfert & Hayes, 1988), and we therefore anticipated that comparable 
manipulations could lead to the contextual control of semantic false memory phenomena. 
In the traditional DRM paradigm, the study list words may themselves serve as 
contextual variables that mutually establish meaning. For example, the word rest is 
semantically related to sleep in the context of pillow, awake, and tired, but rest is 
semantically related to silence in the context of note, measure, and staff. That is, some 
words have more than one meaning, depending on context. Given that meaning is 
oftentimes context dependent, it would follow that false memory could likewise be 
context dependent.  
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Consider, for example, the hypothetical list of study words in Table 1. The 
meaning of the study words might align with either BUSINESS or FARM depending on 
the context of presentation (e.g., an office versus a barn), and one might expect 
subsequent intrusions to be similarly aligned. That is, the natural learning histories of 
English-speaking persons are such that the study words share a context-dependent 
conditionally discriminative function with certain other words (e.g., stock and capital are 
interchangeable responses in the context of BUSINESS, whereas stock and lineage are 
interchangeable responses in the context of FARM). Consequently, one would predict 
that the direct acquisition of a remembering function by the study items would be 
indirectly acquired by words sharing a common contextually-controlled conditionally 
discriminative function (see Wulfert & Hayes, 1988). Such an effect would manifest in 
the form of context-dependent memory intrusions.    
The preceding example involving naturally-occurring semantic relationships is 
speculative, and does not specify a particular learning history responsible for the 
proposed effect. Rather than testing the speculative example, we sought to demonstrate in   
Experiment II the effects of contextually-controlled MTS training on subsequent false 
memory, using words sharing no particular preexperimental semantic relationships. That 
is, we employed a contextually-controlled MTS procedure to produce contextually-
controlled semantic relationships, as evidenced by contextually-controlled functional 
equivalence responding in the form of contextually-controlled false recall. Stimulus co-
occurrence of study words and non-study words was held constant across contexts during 
MTS training in order to highlight the important role that contingencies can play in the 
creation of derived functional relationships and semantic false memories.    
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Table 1 
Hypothetical example of naturalistic contextual control of semantic false memory 
phenomena 
CONTEXT: BUSINESS  CONTEXT: FARM 
Natural Equivalences  Study Words  Natural Equivalences 
capital ← stock → lineage 
Shop ← store → supplies 
upward ← bull → breeder 
downward ← bear → predator 
Sum ← aggregate → soil 
factory ← plant → sew 
criminal ← crook → staff 
↓    ↓ 
Intrusions    Intrusions 
capital    lineage 
downward    predator 
criminal    staff 
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Experiment I 
Method 
Participants. A total of 43 undergraduate psychology students were recruited 
through a departmental web advertisement and participated in Experiment I for course 
credit; 1 graduate student also participated in the study and did not receive compensation. 
Data are omitted for 3 participants who failed to pass the MTS training portion of the 
experiment and for 1 participant who failed to follow directions during the free recall task, 
leaving a total of 40 participants (20 males and 20 females) in the final sample. The mean 
age of participants in the final sample was 20.80 years (SD = 2.96; Range = 18-29) and 
their mean level of education was 13.48 years (SD = 1.52; Range = 12-19). 
Setting, Apparatus, and Materials. Participants completed Experiment I in a quiet 
2 m x 2 m laboratory in the Psychology Department at the University of New Mexico. 
The room contained two chairs, a desk, and a standard desktop computer equipped with a 
mouse for making responses and a 43.2 cm (17 inch) monitor on which stimuli were 
presented. The computer program for presenting stimuli and collecting responses was 
written by the first author and is available upon request. A total of 48 words were chosen 
as experimental stimuli (from Wilson, 1988) on the basis that there was no obvious theme 
uniting them; the list contained adjectives, adverbs, nouns, and verbs (see Figure 1). For 
each participant on an individual basis, 24 words were randomly assigned to be “red 
square words” (RSW’s) and 24 words were randomly assigned to be “blue circle words” 
(BCW’s). Each RSW was randomly paired with a BCW, producing 24 different word 
pairs that served as comparison stimuli in the MTS task described below. Finally, 12 of 
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the RSW’s were randomly assigned for each participant to be study list words on the free 
recall task, also described below.  
 
 
RSW’s 
n 
 
BCW’s 
l 
T
1 
(F
re
e 
R
ec
al
l)
 
AIRPORT 
AROSE 
BATHROOM 
BECAME 
BLONDE 
BLOWING 
CANDLE 
CANNOT 
CEILING 
CHARMING 
CLOTHING 
CONCERT 
COWBOY 
CRISES 
DANCING 
DEALT 
DESERT 
EARNINGS 
EATING 
ESSAY 
ETHICS 
FLOATING 
FOREST 
GRANDMA 
T
2 
T
3 
JUDGMENT 
LAUGHING 
MEANING 
MINUTE 
MOTEL 
OPENING 
PICNIC 
PLASTIC 
POLITICS 
SALESMEN 
SLIDING 
STATED 
STOLEN 
SWOLLEN 
TEETH 
THERMAL 
THYROID 
TIRED 
TODAY 
TRAFFIC 
UNLIKE 
VIOLIN 
WHILE 
YOUNG 
T
4 
T0 (Extra-experimental Intrusions) 
 
Figure 1. The 48 words used in Experiment I. Although shown in alphabetical order here, 
the words were randomly assigned to one of four Types (T1-T4) for each participant. T1 
and T3 words were red square words (RSW’s), and T2 and T4 words were blue circle 
words (BSW’s). T1 words were studied list words for the free recall portion of the 
experiment. Any intrusions that were not T2-T4 words were classified as T0 words.  
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Procedure. After meeting the experimenter and signing statements of informed 
consent, participants began the experiment with a computerized training procedure. This 
training was intended to establish two 24-member functional equivalence classes and 
consisted of an arbitrary, two-comparison, MTS task. Training followed a one-to-many 
format, with the colored shapes (i.e., a red square or a blue circle) always serving as 
samples and the words as comparisons. Participants read the following instructions on the 
computer screen and any questions were clarified by the experimenter: 
Welcome to the experiment! In this part of the experiment, you will see 
either a square or circle in the top third of the screen and a pair of words 
on the bottom third of the screen. Your job is to pick the word that 
"matches" the current shape. You can pick the word on the left by pressing 
the left mouse button, or pick the word on the right by pressing the right 
mouse button. If you pick the correct word you will see a happy face, and 
if you pick the incorrect word you will see a sad face. Once you pick the 
correct word from the pair twice in a row, the shape will change. Then you 
will have to match a word from the pair to the new shape. You will get a 
new pair of words once you have successfully matched twice in a row for 
the square and the circle. Then you will continue with this same process 
for a number of word pairs. There are a limited number of word pairs. 
Once you have gone through all of the word pairs, you will get feedback 
about your performance. If you get a high enough score, we will move on 
to the next part of the experiment. It is important for the experiment that 
you learn which words go with which shapes, so if your score isn't high 
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enough, you will go through all of the word pairs again until your memory 
score is high enough. Please let the experimenter know if you have any 
questions. Press [SPACE BAR] to start training. 
As depicted in Figure 1, there were five Types of words. Type zero (T0) words 
were any words other than the 48 words used as stimuli in the experiment, representing 
extra-experimental intrusions during the free recall task. Type one (T1) words were the 
12 RSW’s that were randomly assigned to be study list words during the free recall task. 
Type two (T2) words were the 12 BCW’s paired with the T1 words as comparisons 
during MTS training; T1 and T2 words frequently co-occurred during MTS training. 
Type three (T3) words were the remaining 12 RSW’s that were non-study words. Type 
four (T4) words were the 12 BCW’s paired with the T3 words as comparisons during 
MTS training; T3 and T4 words frequently co-occurred during MTS training.  
On each training trial, a sample shape (i.e., a red square or a blue circle) appeared 
in the center of the top third of the computer screen and two words  (i.e., a T1-T2 pair or 
a T3-T4 pair) appeared on either side of the bottom third of the computer screen. The 
left-right positions of the two words in a pair were randomly determined on each trial, 
and participants were required to select one of the two words using a left or right mouse-
button press. Correct responses were scored if the participant selected a RSW in the 
presence of the red square sample or a BCW in the presence of the blue circle sample. 
Correct responses were followed by the presentation of a happy face and a pleasant chime 
sound, whereas incorrect responses were followed by the presentation of a sad face and 
an unpleasant buzz sound. A cash reward of $100 was promised and awarded to the 
participant who completed MTS training with the fewest number of errors. 
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Each MTS training block consisted of 24 trial sets consisting of some number of 
trials with each of the 24 word pairs. The number of trials required to complete a set 
depended on the participants’ performance. The order of set presentation was randomly 
determined at the beginning of each block. The first time a word pair appeared in a set of 
trials, the sample was randomly determined and stayed the same on each trial until the 
participant made two consecutive correct responses. At that point the sample shape 
changed from square to circle or from circle to square. Once the participant made two 
consecutive correct responses to the second sample, the set of trials for that word pair was 
completed and a new word pair and sample appeared. At the end of a block of 24 trial 
sets, the percentage of completely correct trial sets (i.e., when no errors were made for a 
word pair) was calculated for the block. Training blocks continued until a 90% trial set 
accuracy criterion was achieved; a perfectly logical “win stay, lose switch” strategy based 
on a random response to the first trial of each set would produce a 50% trial set accuracy 
for that block. Thus, while the 90% criterion is an arbitrary cutoff, it is highly unlikely 
that participants could have achieved this level of performance without learning the 
conditional discriminations. Those participants who failed to achieve the accuracy 
criterion after 40 minutes were dismissed (N = 3), and no further data were collected from 
them. Unlike the original DRIFT design, there were no tests of symmetry or transitivity.  
Following MTS training, participants were required to leave the laboratory and 
take a break for approximately 5 min. Once they returned, they were told that they were 
entering a new phase of the experiment, and were given the following instructions for the 
free recall task: 
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For the next part of the experiment, we will show you some words that we 
want you to remember for a later memory test. The words will 
automatically appear one at a time on the screen. These words that you are 
about to see are the MEMORY TEST words. Please ask the experimenter 
if you have any questions. The words will begin to appear once you press 
the [SPACE BAR].  
The 12 T1 words were then presented on the computer screen one at a time for 2 s 
each with a 2 s inter-stimulus interval, during which the screen was blank. Unlike the 
original DRIFT design, the memory test words’ sample stimulus (i.e., red square) did not 
appear on the screen during study presentation in Experiment I. Following presentation of 
the T1 study list words, participants were shown a screen instructing them to “Remember 
the MEMORY TEST words!” and were then handed a one page article on global 
dimming, which they were asked to read as a distractor task. The distractor task was not 
timed. After reading the article, participants were given a pen and a blank sheet of paper 
and were instructed to write down as many of the study list (T1 free recall) words as they 
could remember, and to notify the experimenter when they had finished. Then the 
experimenter manually entered the recalled words into the computer for scoring, making 
corrections for misspellings, plurality, or suffix substitutions (e.g., CRISIS was recorded 
as CRISES; FLOAT was recorded as FLOATING). 
Part way through collecting data for Experiment I, we realized that it might be of 
interest to record whether or not participants were aware that all of the memory test 
words were RSW’s. From that point on, at the end of the experiment, participants were 
first asked “Did you notice anything in particular about the memory tests words?” If the 
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participant answered in the negative, they were then asked “All of the memory test words 
had something in common. Did you notice what it was?” If this was also answered in the 
negative, they were asked “Did you notice that all of the memory test words were red 
square words?” If the participant answered in the affirmative to any of these questions, 
they were asked to clarify their response. If questioning indicated that the participants had 
noticed the RSW connection between the memory test words, they were classified as 
being “Aware” (n = 6), and if they did not noticed they were classified as being 
“Unaware” (n = 21). Given the relatively low number of Aware participants (i.e., in terms 
of statistical reliability), we ran separate analyses for the total sample and for those 
participants for whom awareness data were collected.       
Results 
The number of blocks participants took to complete MTS training ranged from 2 
to10 (Mean = 5.73; SD = 1.85). On the free recall task, participants from the total sample 
recalled an average of 6.33 correct T1 words (SD = 2.17; Range = 3-11). Participants 
from the Aware sample recalled an average of 7.17 correct T1 words (SD = 1.33; Range 
= 6-9). Participants from the Unaware sample recalled an average of 6.43 correct T1 
words (SD = 2.38; Range = 3-11). There was no significant difference between the 
Aware and Unaware participants in the mean number of words correctly recalled, t(25) = 
0.72, p = .48. Information regarding the number of intrusions for the total sample, the 
Aware participants, and the Unaware participants can be found in Table 2. Individual 
participant data can be found in Table 3. 
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Table 2 
Intrusion Data for the Total Sample, Aware Participants, and Unaware Participants in 
Experiment I 
Sample Type N % of Sum Mean SD Min Max 
Total (N = 40) T0 13 17.7 0.33 .57 0 2 
 T2 14 18.9 0.35 .70 0 3 
 T3 37 50.0 0.93 1.29 0 5 
 T4 10 13.5 0.25 .54 0 2 
 Sum 74 100 1.85 1.72 0 6 
        
Aware (n = 6) T0 1 7.7 0.17 0.41 0 1 
 T2 0 0.0 0.00 0.00 0 0 
 T3 10 76.9 1.67 1.63 0 4 
 T4 2 15.4 0.33 0.82 0 2 
 Sum 13 100 2.17 1.47 0 4 
        
Unaware (n = 21) T0 7 20.6 0.33 0.58 0 2 
 T2 10 29.4 0.48 0.87 0 3 
 T3 12 35.3 0.57 1.21 0 5 
 T4 5 14.7 0.24 0.54 0 2 
 Sum 34 100 1.62 1.86 0 6 
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Table 3  
Individual Participant Data from Experiment I 
 
Case Order Tested 
Training 
Blocks Aware T1 
Intrusions 
T0 T2 T3 T4 
1 1 6 . 4 0 1 0 0 
2 2 6 . 6 0 1 0 0 
3 3 6 . 9 0 0 0 0 
4 4 4 . 3 0 0 1 1 
5 5 2 . 6 0 0 1 0 
6 6 4 . 7 0 0 3 0 
7 7 6 . 9 1 0 0 0 
8 8 4 . 8 0 0 0 0 
9 9 5 . 4 0 0 2 0 
10 10 4 . 6 0 1 3 0 
11 11 6 . 3 0 1 2 1 
12 12 5 . 4 0 0 2 0 
13 13 4 . 6 2 0 1 1 
 
14 16 5 Yes 8 1 0 4 0 
15 17 6 Yes 6 1 0 3 0 
16 25 4 Yes 8 1 0 2 0 
17 29 9 Yes 9 0 0 0 2 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
18 31 10 Yes 6 1 0 0 0 
19 40 4 Yes 6 0 0 1 0 
 
20 14 6 No 5 1 0 0 0 
21 15 5 No 4 0 0 0 0 
22 18 6 No 8 0 3 0 0 
23 19 8 No 3 0 0 0 0 
24 20 4 No 9 0 1 0 0 
25 21 7 No 9 0 0 1 0 
26 22 6 No 6 0 0 0 0 
27 23 8 No 4 0 0 0 0 
28 24 8 No 8 0 1 0 1 
29 26 9 No 4 0 0 0 0 
30 27 8 No 3 0 0 0 0 
31 28 6 No 8 0 1 5 0 
32 30 4 No 5 0 0 0 1 
33 32 8 No 5 0 2 1 2 
34 33 5 No 9 0 0 0 0 
35 34 5 No 5 0 0 0 0 
36 35 4 No 10 0 2 2 1 
37 36 5 No 7 1 0 1 0 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
38 37 3 No 5 0 0 0 0 
39 38 5 No 7 0 0 2 0 
40 39 9 No 11 0 0 0 0 
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We present data on the occurrence of T0 intrusions, as this phenomenon may be 
of some conceptual interest to readers. However, we did not include T0 intrusions in our 
formal analyses because these words were likely to have been recalled on the basis of 
uncontrolled extra-experimental learning histories. Of the experimental stimuli, we 
anticipated that T4 words would be the least likely to be intruded on the grounds that T4 
words never co-occurred with T1 words, and because T4 words were not assigned to 
participate in the same class as T1 words. As such, T4 words would be the least likely to 
indirectly acquire the remembering function of the T1 words. We therefore conducted 
two comparisons using the mean number of T4 intrusions as a baseline: a) the difference 
between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions, which would reveal the effect of co-
occurrence for T1 and T2 words relative to the absence of co-occurrence for T1 and T4 
words, and b) the difference between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions, which 
would reveal the influence of shared class assignment by T1 and T3 words relative to the 
absence of co-occurrence and differential class membership for T1 and T4 words. We 
also examined the difference between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions, which 
would reveal the effects of shared class assignment relative to co-occurrence. 
Experiment I intrusion data for the total sample can be seen in Figure 2. A one-
way within-subjects ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity 
indicated a significant difference among the mean number of T2, T3, and T4 intrusions in 
the total sample, F(1.42, 55.52) = 6.97, p = .005, η2 = .15. Post hoc analyses were 
conducted using pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction. The test of the co-
occurrence effect showed that the difference between the mean number of T2 intrusions 
and T4 intrusions was not significant (p = .999). However, the difference between the 
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mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions was significant (p = .014) as was the difference 
between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions (p = .042), indicating a relatively 
strong effect of shared class assignment.  
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
T2 T3 T4M
ea
n 
N
um
be
r 
of
 In
tr
us
io
ns
 (S
E
)
Intrusion Type
 
Figure 2. The mean number of intrusions by Type for the total sample in Experiment I. 
 
Separate analyses were run for those participants who had been classified 
according to their awareness that all of the study words were RSW’s. Data for these 
analyses can be seen in Figure 3. A 2 x 3 (Awareness x Intrusion Type) mixed-design 
ANOVA with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity indicated a nonsignificant 
main effect of Awareness, (1, 25) = 0.72, p = .403, partial η2 = .03, and a significant main 
effect of Intrusion Type, F(1.43, 35.81) = 5.81, p = .012, partial η2 = .19. However, these 
results must be interpreted in light of a significant interaction between Awareness and 
Intrusion Type, (1.43, 35.81) = 3.74, p = .047, partial η2 = .13. Analyses of the simple 
Contextual DRIFT   24 
 
main effect of Intrusion Type at each level of Awareness were conducted using pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections. Among the Aware participants, there was no 
significant difference between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions (p = .912), or 
between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions (p = .116). However, the difference 
between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions was significant (p = .019). Among the 
Unaware participants, there was no significant difference between the mean number of 
T2 and T4 intrusions (p = .520), between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions (p 
= .925), or between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions (p = .999). Thus, only the 
Aware participants gave any indication of elevated T3 intrusions. 
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Figure 3. The interaction between Awareness and Intrusion Type in Experiment I.  
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Experiment I Discussion 
 The results of Experiment I replicate the findings of the original DRIFT design, 
and indicate that tests of symmetry and transitivity are not essential components of the 
DRIFT paradigm. Even in the absence of tests of stimulus equivalence, non-study words 
that had been assigned to participate in the same functional equivalence class as study list 
words were more likely to be intruded than non-study words that had been assigned to a 
different class. Furthermore, participants’ self-report data suggests that the occurrence of 
elevated same-class intruding was largely limited to those participants who abstracted 
that all of the study list words came from a common class (i.e., the finding was largely 
limited to those participants who reported that they were aware that all of the memory 
test words were “red square words”). While the variables determining reports of 
awareness were not systematically addressed in the current study, demonstrating a 
correlation between awareness and intruding represents an important first step in 
identifying additional environmental variables, outside of MTS training, that can 
influence false recall.  
 In addition to addressing the question of whether equivalence testing is essential 
to the DRIFT paradigm, Experiment I also served as a pilot study for the design of 
Experiment II. First, although we did not measure the proposed effect, we presumed that 
the inclusion of the sample stimulus during study list presentation in the original DRIFT 
design would assist participants in abstracting the common conditionally discriminative 
function of the study list words, thereby boosting subsequent false recall. The Awareness 
findings of Experiment I were not inconsistent with this presumption, and we therefore 
reintroduced the presentation of the sample stimulus during study list presentation in 
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Experiment II in an attempt to maximize effects. Second, we did not want contextually-
controlled MTS training to be overly burdensome to participants in Experiment II, so 
Experiment I was intended to test the plausibility of a relatively streamlined version of 
the original DRIFT design. Specifically, there were three classes (and equivalence 
testing) in the original design, but only two classes in Experiment I. Given that we were 
able to produce the intended false recall effects under the streamlined design of 
Experiment I, this design served as the foundation for the ostensibly more difficult 
contextually-controlled MTS training of Experiment II.                        
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Experiment II 
Method 
Participants. A total of 83 undergraduate psychology students were recruited 
through a departmental web advertisement and participated in Experiment II for course 
credit; none of them had participated in Experiment I. Although all participants received 
comparable contextually-controlled interrelated conditional discrimination training 
during the first phase of the experiment, participants were randomly assigned to a 
Context 1 (C1) group or a Context 2 (C2) group for the memory test phase of the 
experiment. The data from several participants were omitted from analyses due to failures 
to comply with the experimental procedure (n = 5), spontaneous disclosures of 
neurological disorders (n = 3), the spontaneous disclosure of recent severe distress (n = 
1), highly atypical responding (n = 1), or failures to pass discriminative training by 
completing a block of MTS training with 90% trial set accuracy within the allotted time 
(n = 25), leaving a total sample of 48 participants.  
Setting, Apparatus, and Materials. Experiment II involved the same setting and 
apparatus as Experiment I. MTS training stimuli in Experiment II were similar to those 
employed in Experiment I, including the same red square and blue circle sample stimuli. 
However, only 40 of the words from Experiment I were used as comparison stimuli in 
Experiment II (see Figure 4). The number of words per Type was reduced in an attempt 
to make it easier for participants to learn the contextually-controlled conditional 
discriminations within the allotted time. Depending on context (C1 or C2), words were 
presented either on a magenta background in white, italic, 20 point, Orlando font (C1), or 
on a green background in black, regular, 18 point, Jokewood font (C2).  
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DEALT  T31 T41  STOLEN 
T
4   
DESERT  T32 T42  SWOLLEN 
EARNINGS  T33 T43  THERMAL 
EATING  T34 T44  THYROID 
ESSAY  T35 T45  TIRED 
ETHICS  T36 T46  TODAY 
FLOATING  T37 T47  TRAFFIC 
FOREST  T38 T48  UNLIKE 
GRANDMA  T39 T49  VIOLIN 
JUDGMENT  T310 T410  YOUNG 
        
        
 
Figure 4. The 40 words used in Experiment II. Although shown in alphabetical order here, 
the words were randomly assigned to one of four Types (T1-T4) for each participant. T1 
words were RSW’s regardless of context, and were studied list words for the free recall 
portion of the experiment. T2 words were BCW’s in C1 but RSW’s in C2. T3 words were 
RSW’s in C1 but BCW’s in C2. T4 words were BCW’s regardless of context. Any 
intrusions that were not T2-T4 words were classified as T0 words. Superscripts denote 
specific randomly-assigned words of a given Type, and can be cross-referenced with 
Table 4. 
 
 
Procedure. Experiment II followed the same general progression as Experiment I. 
Experiment II began with a computerized MTS training procedure intended to establish 
four contextually-controlled, 20-member functional equivalence classes via a contextual, 
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arbitrary, two-comparison, MTS task. Participants read the same instructions as were 
presented in Experiment I. The experimenter also gave the following verbal instructions 
to participants: “There are actually three things you will have to pay attention to: the 
words, the shapes, and also the background color of the screen makes a difference. So 
between the background color of the screen and the shape, there is enough information to 
tell you which of the two words you should pick. Do you have any questions?” Any 
questions were then clarified by the experimenter. 
For each participant, the 40 stimulus words were randomly assigned to one of four 
Types (see Figure 4). T0 words were any words other than the 40 words used as stimuli 
in the experiment, representing extra-experimental intrusions during the free recall task. 
T1 words were always RSW’s regardless of context, and were presented as study items 
during the free recall memory test. T2 words were BCW’s that were consistently paired 
with T1 words in C1, but were same-class non-study RSW’s in C2. T3 words were same-
class non-study RSW’s in C1, but were BCW’s consistently paired with T1 words in C2. 
T4 words were BCW’s regardless of context, and were paired with T3 words in C1 but 
paired with T2 words in C2.   
On each training trial, a sample shape (i.e., a red square or a blue circle) appeared 
in the center of the top third of the computer screen and two words appeared on either 
side of the bottom third of the screen (i.e., a T1-T2 pair or a T3-T4 pair in C1; a T1-T3 
pair or a T2-T4 pair in C2). The left-right positions of the two words in the pair were 
randomly determined on each trial, and participants were required to select one of the two 
words using a left or right mouse-button press. Correct responses were scored if the 
participant selected a contextually-controlled RSW in the presence of the red square 
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sample or a contextually-controlled BCW in the presence of the blue circle sample. 
Correct responses were followed by the presentation of a happy face and a pleasant chime 
sound, whereas incorrect responses were followed by the presentation of a sad face and 
an unpleasant buzz sound. A cash reward of $100 was promised and awarded to the 
participant who completed training with the fewest number of errors. 
Each training block consisted of 20 trial sets consisting of some number of trials 
(see Table 4). Each trial set was comprised of four problems. In illustration of the four 
problems in the first trial set, Problem 1 consisted of a C1 magenta background with a red 
square sample, T11 and T21 as comparison stimuli, with the correct response being T11. 
Problem 2 consisted of a C1 magenta background with a blue circle sample, T11 and T21 
as comparison stimuli, with the correct response being T21. Problem 3 consisted of a C2 
green background with a red square sample, T11 and T31 as comparison stimuli, with the 
correct response being T11. Finally, Problem 4 consisted of a C2 green background with a 
blue circle sample, T11 and T31 as comparison stimuli, with the correct response being 
T31. The order of set presentation was randomly determined at the beginning of each 
block. The number of trials required to complete a set depended on the participants’ 
performance. Each set always began in either C1 or C2, counterbalanced across 
participants. The first time a comparison word pair appeared in a set of trials (or after a 
context switch), the sample was randomly determined and stayed the same on each trial 
until the participant made two consecutive correct responses. At that point the sample 
shape changed from square to circle or from circle to square, but the comparison stimuli 
were unchanged (with the exception that comparison position was randomly determined 
on each trial). Once the participant made two consecutive correct responses to the second 
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Table 4 
The sample and comparison stimuli presented in each trial set during the contextually 
controlled interrelated conditional discrimination training of Experiment II 
 
 
Context 1  Context 2 
 
 
Problem 1 
 
Sample:  
 
Red Square   
Problem 2 
 
Sample: 
  
Blue Circle   
Problem 3 
 
Sample:  
 
Red Square  
Problem 4 
 
Sample:  
 
Blue Circle 
 
 
Comparison 
 
Stimuli  
 
Comparison  
 
Stimuli  
 
Comparison  
 
Stimuli  
Comparison  
 
Stimuli 
 
Set RSW BCW  RSW BCW  RSW BCW  RSW BCW 
 
Set 1 
 
T11 
 
T21 
 
 
T11 
 
T21 
 
 
T11 
 
T31 
  
T11 
 
T31 
 
Set 2 T12 T22  T12 T22  T12 T32  T12 T32 
Set 3 T13 T23  T13 T23  T13 T33  T13 T33 
Set 4 T14 T24  T14 T24  T14 T34  T14 T34 
Set 5 T15 T25  T15 T25  T15 T35  T15 T35 
Set 6 T16 T26  T16 T26  T16 T36  T16 T36 
Set 7 T17 T27  T17 T27  T17 T37  T17 T37 
Set 8 T18 T28  T18 T28  T18 T38  T18 T38 
Set 9 T19 T29  T19 T29  T19 T39  T19 T39 
Set 10 T110 T210  T110 T210  T110 T310  T110 T310 
Set 11 T31 T41  T31 T41  T21 T41  T21 T41 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Set 12 T32 T42  T32 T42  T22 T42  T22 T42 
Set 13 T33 T43  T33 T43  T23 T43  T23 T43 
Set 14 T34 T44  T34 T44  T24 T44  T24 T44 
Set 15 T35 T45  T35 T45  T25 T45  T25 T45 
Set 16 T36 T46  T36 T46  T26 T46  T26 T46 
Set 17 T37 T47  T37 T47  T27 T47  T27 T47 
Set 18 T38 T48  T38 T48  T28 T48  T28 T48 
Set 19 T39 T49  T39 T49  T29 T49  T29 T49 
Set 20 T310 T410  T310 T410  T210 T410  T210 T410 
 
Note. Superscripts denote specific randomly-assigned words of a given Type, and can be 
cross-referenced with Figure 2. 
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sample shape, the context would switch. Participants would then have to make two 
consecutive correct responses to another RSW and two consecutive correct responses to 
another BCW in the second context before the set of trials was completed. At the end of a 
block of 20 trial sets, the percentage of completely correct trial sets (i.e., when no errors 
were made for either of the C1 word pair problems or either of the C2 word pair 
problems in the set) was calculated for the block. Training blocks continued until a 90% 
trial set accuracy criterion was achieved in a single training block. Those participants 
who failed to achieve the accuracy criterion after 100 minutes were given a break and 
automatically advanced to the next phase of the experiment; their data are excluded from 
analyses. Participants who passed MTS training (or ran out of time) were then required to 
leave the laboratory and take a break for approximately 5 min.  
Once they returned, participants were told that they were entering a new phase of 
the experiment, and were given the same free recall instructions that were presented in 
Experiment I. After reading these instructions off of the computer screen, the 
experimenter also gave the following verbal instructions to participants: “Even though all 
of the words that you are about to see will be familiar to you, when I later ask you to 
remember the memory test words, they are just the words that you are about to see. Do 
you have any questions?” Any questions were then clarified by the experimenter. The 10 
T1 words were then presented on the computer screen one at a time below a red square 
for 2 s each with a 2 s inter-stimulus interval. As in the original DRIFT design, the red 
square stimulus was presented during the presentation of the study list words in 
Experiment II, with the hopes of heightening the false memory effects that come with 
“awareness” of the study list words’ red-square interrelation. For participants in the C1 
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group, the T1 words were presented on a magenta background in the corresponding C1 
font, whereas participants in the C2 group were shown the T1 words on a green 
background in the corresponding C2 font.  
Following presentation of the study list, participants were shown a reminder 
screen instructing them to “Remember the MEMORY TEST words!” and were then 
handed a one page article on global dimming, which they were asked to read as a 
distractor task. The background color and font of the reminder screen was appropriate to 
context, and remained on the computer screen throughout the distractor task and during 
the recall period. After reading the article, participants were given a pen and a blank sheet 
of paper and were instructed to write down as many of the Memory Test (T1 free recall) 
words as they could remember, and to notify the experimenter when they had finished. 
Then the experimenter manually entered the recalled words into the computer for scoring, 
making corrections for misspellings, plurality, or suffix substitutions. No awareness data 
were collected. 
Results 
As can be seen in Table 5, there were no significant differences between the C1 
and C2 groups in mean age, mean years of education, proportion of females (coded as 0) 
and males (coded as 1), mean number of blocks taken to complete discriminative training, 
mean number of total errors made during discriminative training, mean number of 
erroneously recalled T0 words, or mean number of correctly recalled T1 words. In 
summary, context was not related to these demographic and performance variables, as 
anticipated.  
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Table 5  
T-test comparisons of the C1 and C2 groups on demographic and control variables in 
Experiment II  
  
Total (N = 48)  C1 (n = 22)  C2 (n = 26)   
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
SD  
 
Mean 
 
SD  
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
t 
 
p 
 
Age 19.79 2.11  19.55 2.11  20.00 2.14 -0.74 .46 
 
Sex .33 .48  .23 .43  .42 .50 -1.44 .16 
 
Education 13.17 1.16  13.09 1.15  13.23 1.18 -0.41 .68 
 
Blocks 9.19 2.77  9.00 1.98  9.35 3.32 -0.43 .67 
 
Errors 119.31 42.93  122.73 46.60  116.42 40.27 0.53 .61 
 
T0 Recall 0.21 .50  0.18 0.50  0.23 0.51 -0.33 .74 
 
T1 Recall 5.96 1.93  5.55 1.95  6.31 1.89 -1.37 .18 
 
Note. Females were coded as 0, and males were coded as 1. 
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Experiment II intrusion data can be seen in Figure 5. A 2 x 3 (Context Group x 
Intrusion Type) mixed-design ANOVA with Greenhouse-Geisser corrections for 
sphericity indicated a significant main effect of Context Group, (1, 46) = 6.30, p = .016, 
partial η2 = .12. The main effect of Intrusion Type was also significant, F(1.95, 89.83) = 
8.79, p < .001, partial η2 = .16. However, the two significant main effects must be 
interpreted in light of a significant interaction between Context Group and Intrusion Type, 
F(1.95, 89.83) = 4.32, p = .017, partial η2 = .09. Post hoc analyses were conducted by 
analyzing the simple main effect of Intrusion Type at each level of Context Group using 
pairwise comparisons and a Bonferroni correction. Within the first Context Group (C1), 
there was no significant difference between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions (p 
= .424), the difference between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions was significant 
(p = .001), and there was no significant difference between the mean number of T2 and 
T3 intrusions (p = .122). Within the second Context Group (C2), there was a significant 
difference between the mean number of T2 and T4 intrusions (p = .004), there was no 
significant difference between the mean number of T3 and T4 intrusions (p = .308), and  
there was no significant difference between the mean number of T2 and T3 intrusions (p 
= .247). Thus, elevated intruding was evidenced for those words assigned to the same 
class as the T1 study list words, in accordance with the contextual control of class 
membership.    
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Figure 5. The interaction between memory test Context and Intrusion Type in 
Experiment II. 
 
Experiment II Discussion 
 The results of Experiment II suggest that the remembering function of the T1 
words was differentially acquired by the T2 and T3 words depending on the memory test 
context, thereby demonstrating the engineered contextual control of semantic false 
memory phenomena. As with Experiment I, these results were obtained in the absence of 
tests of symmetry and transitivity, indicating that equivalence testing is not a necessary 
component of the DRIFT paradigm.   
 By visual inspection, the highest levels of intruding came from non-study words 
assigned to the same class as study words within a given context, intermediate levels of 
intruding came from non-study words that were assigned to a different class but had 
frequently co-occurred with study words within a given context, and the lowest levels of 
intruding came from non-study words that were assigned to a different class and had 
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never co-occurred with study words regardless of context. There are at least two 
explanations for this graded pattern of intrusions. One possibility is that the indirect 
acquisition of stimulus functions is especially likely among stimuli assigned to the same 
class within a given context, but also somewhat likely among stimuli that have frequently 
co-occured within a given context. That is, it is possible that stimulus co-occurrence is 
indeed causally related to intruding, but that functional relationships (e.g., the 
manipulation of contingencies that lead to derived relational responding) exhibit stronger 
control over intruding. Alternatively, participants may have not fully discriminated the 
contextual stimuli, resulting in the formation of a class consisting of T1 words along with 
differential numbers of T2 and T3 words. That is, given only partial discrimination of the 
contextual stimuli, there would still be some context-dependent differences between T2 
and T3 words in their susceptibility to function acquisition, though class membership 
would not be completely determined by context. These two explanations are not mutually 
exclusive; stimulus co-occurrence and incomplete contextual control could have operated 
simultaneously to produce the observed effects. In all cases, the functional relationship 
between stimuli would appear to play an important role in accounting for the observed 
pattern of intrusions.    
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General Discussion 
 The present study demonstrates that false memory phenomena can be brought 
under contextual control: words sharing a contextually-controlled conditionally 
discriminative function with study words were more likely to be intruded when a memory 
test occurred in the corresponding context, relative to words that did not share a common 
conditionally discriminative function. Thus, it would appear that the behaviors 
constituting false memory phenomena can take the form of contextually-controlled 
functional equivalence responding (see Donahoe & Palmer, 2004; Dougher & Markham, 
1994; Dougher & Markham, 1996; Goldiamond, 1962, 1966; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988). 
Furthermore, the present results were obtained without resorting to experimentally 
preexisting semantic relationships (c.f. Deese, 1959a, 1959b; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995), and without testing for symmetry or transitivity (see Sidman & Tailby, 1982). 
Instead, it would appear that contextually-controlled semantic relationships were 
produced through contextual MTS training alone, as evidenced by higher rates of 
intruding for words that had been assigned to be semantically related to study words 
within the constraints of contextual control. The present results are consistent with other 
research indicating the viability of equivalence relations as a satisfactory behavior 
analytic account of semantic meaning (e.g., Barnes-Holmes et al., 2005; Guinther & 
Dougher, 2010; Hayes & Bisset, 1998), and show that the DRIFT paradigm can be 
usefully modified for the purposes of studying semantic false memory phenomena.  
 Under the original DRIFT design (Guinther & Dougher, 2010), participants were 
given tests of symmetry and transitivity during MTS training, permitting a demonstration 
of stimulus equivalence responding in a subgroup of participants. Furthermore, those 
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participants who exhibited stimulus equivalence responding were also more likely to 
exhibit higher levels of intruding for T3 non-study words that had been assigned to the 
same class as T1 study words (i.e., they were more likely to exhibit class-specific 
functional equivalence responding). There are at least three reasons to suspect that testing 
for stimulus equivalence responding could have influenced subsequent functional 
equivalence responding. First, stimulus equivalence testing required that same-class 
words appear simultaneously, thereby introducing a source of stimulus co-occurrence for 
T1 and T3 words. To the extent that stimulus co-occurrence builds “associations” in 
cognitive networks (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Collins & Loftus, 1975; McNamara, 1992), 
one would expect that equivalence testing could have lead to increased levels of intruding 
for same-class T3 words. Second, people will sometimes exhibit stimulus equivalence 
responding with respect to stimuli that have historically co-occurred (Barnes et al., 1996; 
Leader et al., 1996; Tonneau, Arreola, & Martinez, 2006). To the extent that co-
occurrence leads to stimulus equivalence responding and to the extent that the learning 
histories capable of producing stimulus equivalence responding are the same as the 
learning histories capable of producing functional equivalence responding, one would 
expect that co-occurrence during stimulus equivalence testing could have lead to 
increased levels of intruding for same-class T3 words. (These two explanations, however, 
do not take in to account the fact that differently-classed incorrect comparisons also co-
occurred with T1 words during stimulus equivalence testing.) Third, testing for stimulus 
equivalence could have established the experimental context as a “context of relating” 
(see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), thereby increasing the likelihood that 
participants would derive stimulus equivalence relations and functional equivalence 
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relations. Thus, establishing the experimental context as a context of relating could have 
lead to increased levels of intruding for same-class T3 words. However, elevated same-
class intrusions (Experiment I) and elevated contextually-controlled same-class intrusions 
(Experiment II) were also obtained in the current DRIFT designs, which did not include 
tests for stimulus equivalence. Thus, while further experimentation would be required to 
determine whether stimulus equivalence testing influences subsequent intruding, stimulus 
equivalence testing does not appear to be a necessary component of the DRIFT paradigm.                     
 As was the case in our original DRIFT study (Guinther & Dougher, 2010), we 
found no definitive evidence of an effect of stimulus co-occurrence on subsequent false 
recall in the current designs. In particular, the results of Experiment I provide no evidence 
of an effect of co-occurrence but do provide evidence for an effect of functional 
relationships (i.e., the manipulation of contingencies leading to derived relational 
responding would appear to account for the elevated levels of T3 intruding). In contrast, 
the results of Experiment II could be partially explained by an appeal to a combination of 
stimulus co-occurrence and functional relationships, though they could also be explained 
through an appeal to functional relationships alone. As was the case in the original 
DRIFT design, stimulus co-occurrence was confounded with class membership during 
MTS training, a factor that could have overridden any potential effect of stimulus co-
occurrence. Thus, though co-occurrence may indeed play a role in producing false 
memory phenomena, an appeal to functional relationships would appear to be necessary 
when accounting for the present findings.        
 In a related vein, under the original DRIFT design we found that higher levels of 
MTS training achievement were associated with lower levels of intruding for words 
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assigned to a different class from study list words. We labeled this finding a “semantic 
suppression” effect, and noted that some participants reported that they had considered 
writing down differently-classed non-study words during recall but then decided against 
this course of action in recognition of differential class membership (e.g., “I thought 
about writing down garden, but then I didn’t because I knew it was a circle word but all 
of the memory test words were square words.”). A semantic suppression effect may also 
be reflected in the performances of Aware participants in Experiment I, who intruded no 
T2 words despite their frequent co-occurrence with T1 words. However, it is unclear why 
this ostensible semantic suppression effect would be evident for T2 but not T4 words. 
Furthermore, the observed pattern of data may not be especially reliable, reflecting the 
performance of only 6 Aware participants relative to 21 Unaware participants. Thus, a 
determination of the relationship between Awareness, elevated levels of intruding for 
semantically related same-class non-study words, and the semantic suppression of 
differently-classed non-study words requires further replication and experimentation. 
 While the conditions that lead to the behaviors that constitute false memory 
phenomena are an important target of investigation, an understanding of false memory 
has broader implications for the development of a fuller understanding of interpretation 
and meaning. The original DRIFT design and Experiment I can be thought of as methods 
for generating synonyms (i.e., T1 and T3 words come to “mean the same thing” as a 
result of MTS training), whereas the design of Experiment II can be thought of as a 
method for generating homonyms (i.e., as a result of contextually-controlled MTS 
training, T1 words come to “mean the same thing” as T3 words in one context, but T1 
words come to “mean the same thing” as T2 words in another context). Once such newly-
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acquired meanings are in place, they would appear to interact with peoples’ 
interpretations of events. That is, as a general rule, people do not simply remember an 
event, but rather tend to remember their subjective interpretations of the meaning of the 
event, as manifest in a combination of “true” and “false” recollections of the event (see 
Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Thus, one can alter people’s recollections of an event by 
altering people’s interpretations of the meaning of the event.  
The results of Experiment II suggest that people can interpret the meaning of a 
single event (e.g., the presentation of a list of words) in multiple different ways, 
depending on learning history and contextual variables. This finding has some interesting 
implications that could lead to the development of more effective therapeutic 
technologies. For example, cognitive therapy (Beck, 1976) is explicitly concerned with 
cognitive biases, and has proven to be effective in the treatment of a variety of mental 
disorders. The memory structures (e.g., semantic networks, associative networks, 
prototypes, etc.) thought to underlay false memory phenomena are akin to the 
dysfunctional mental schema thought by cognitive therapists to underlay maladaptive 
behaviors (see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). However, the theoretical rationale of cognitive 
therapy is largely based in prediction and relies on hypothetical mental structures that 
cannot be directly manipulated. Thus, the ability to influence false memory phenomena 
directly through the manipulation of environmental variables, as opposed to merely 
predicting these phenomena, may more effectively translate into an ability to influence 
maladaptive health behaviors.  
We believe Experiment II provides a rough behavior analytic model of some of 
the cognitive biases that are sometimes attributed to hypothetical mental schema. For 
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example, C1 could be representative of a depressive schema and C2 could be 
representative of an adaptive schema, leading to the biased recollection of depressive 
material (e.g., T3 words) or adaptive material (e.g., T2 words), respectively. Consistent 
with this contention, a recent study by Ruci, Tomes, and Zelenski (2009) suggests that 
one important contextual variable that can bias recollections is a person’s own mood. 
These researchers used mood inductions to place participants in either a positive, 
negative, or control mood, and then gave them valenced DRM word lists consisting of 
either positive (e.g., beautiful, sweet, wish), negative (e.g., anger, trash, smoke), or 
control (e.g., pen, chair, needle) words. It was found that participants were more likely to 
intrude the DRM lists’ critical root words when participants’ induced mood was 
congruent with the valence of the study list. A clinical implication of this finding is that a 
person’s mood could serve as a contextual variable controlling the distorted recollection 
of events. In turn, these distorted recollections could perpetuate the initial mood. But as 
was the case with the original DRM paradigm, the mood-congruent semantic associations 
and false memories of the Ruci et al. study were based in relationships that had been 
established prior to experimentation. That is, although an important phenomenon was 
illuminated, their procedures allowed prediction but not influence. In contrast, the DRIFT 
paradigm is explicitly concerned with the exploration of environmental variables that can 
be manipulated in the service of influencing biases in memory. It is our hope that ongoing 
translational research using the DRIFT paradigm can be used to develop new therapeutic 
technologies that help people interpret, reinterpret, and recollect their experiences in 
ways that promote adaptive functioning.     
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